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The volume of the primary market of certificates for retail investors has increased
enormously in the past ten years, and German banks have recently started issuing
credit-linked notes (CLNs). As with other types of certificates, the question can be
raised as to whether coupon payments for these instruments are fair and adequate
compared with the related risk and, if not, what the reasons for this mispricing
are. In this paper we analyze the pricing of 136 outstanding CLNs and discover
that CLNs are generally greatly overpriced in the primary market. Furthermore,
we find strong evidence for an essential hypothesis that is still debated in the
literature: the more complex the product and the less transparent the market, the
more overpricing there tends to be.
1 INTRODUCTION
The volume of the primary market of certificates for retail investors has increased
enormously in the past ten years. Beginning with simple cash or share bonds, banks
have issued increasingly complex products over that time period. Recently, German
banks have started to issue credit-linked certificates, called credit linked notes (CLNs),
which allow them to securitize their credit risk, especially concentration risk. The
mechanism of a CLN is as follows. The buyer of a CLN only receives the payments
for the notes if the reference entity (which is some other debtor) does not go into
default. Investors therefore have the option to invest in the credit risk of debtors,
which they normally cannot. At this point, investors can buy the credit risks of several
large reference entities with a basket-credit-linked note. In contrast with simple CLNs,
the buyer of a basket-credit-linked note only receives payments if all the reference
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entities (first-to-default model) do not go into default. In this way, the higher risk
is only taken by the buyer in case an attractive coupon payment is linked to notes.
Hence, in a similar way to other types of certificates, the question can be raised as
to whether the coupon payments for, and the issue prices of, these instruments are
fair and adequate compared with the related risk and, if not, what the reasons for this
mispricing are.
There are several studies on equity-linked notes, or certificates, especially on the
European markets. The first studies by Chen et al (1990) and Chen and Sears (1990)
concentrate on finding significant differences between quoted prices and theoretically
fair values of products in the US market, while more recent studies by, for example,
Burth et al (2001), Brown and Davis (2004), Wilkens et al (2003) and Gruenbichler
and Wohlwend (2005) ascertain the overpricing in several non-US primary markets
for reverse convertibles, discount certificates or endowment warrants. Consequently,
subsequent studies have concentrated on discovering the causes of overpricing. Over-
pricing seems to be positively related to the replicability and the complexity of the
product, among other causes (see, for example, Benet et al (2006) and Entrop et al
(2009)). This theory is supported by several studies (see Hernández et al (2007a) and
Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005)). Furthermore, Wallmeier and Diethelm (2009) show
that high coupons stimulate the interests of retail investors and are linked to a large
overpricing of these certificates.
There is no comparable study of overpricing. The results of such a study would be
of special interest because they would shed some light on the reasons for overpricing.
These products are similar to bonds and reverse convertibles, and they make retail
investors believe that they are straight bonds. Furthermore, the replicability for private
investors, in contrast with institutional investors, is not practicable and the complexity
of the valuation procedure only results in a monotone ascending function of the size
of the basket of reference entities. We can therefore measure the complexity by means
of an ordered scale since complexity strictly increases with the number of reference
entities and payment days. Hence, our research question can be established as follows:
are coupon payments for, and issue prices of, the CLN fair and adequate compared
with the related risk, and if not, what are the reasons for the mispricing?
To answer this question we first identify all major CLN issuers in the German
market and gather the issue prospectuses of their 136 outstanding CLN products.
After collecting the data, a valuation model is developed to determine theoretically fair
values by means of market prices only. Our approach aims to calculate the differences
between fair values and prices offered. We are also able to empirically verify several
hypotheses that we formulate for the German CLN market.
First, we introduce the underlying theory of credit derivatives (with particular focus
on CLNs) and formulate our hypotheses. We then explain the details of our valuation
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FIGURE 1 The concept of CLNs.
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framework and describe the data sources used during the valuation process. After
preparing both the model and the data, we present the results of CLN valuation and test
which of the hypotheses that we formulated before the valuation are statistically valid.
Finally, the knowledge gained by our empirical analysis is summarized and some
suggestions concerning the improvement and extension of our work are provided.
2 PRODUCTS AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 CLNs for the retail investor
A CLN is a credit derivative that represents a bilateral contract under which the seller
sells the credit risk of the reference entity and receives a certain premium from the
protection buyer (Fabozzi et al (2007, p. 67)). The payment structure of a CLN is
linked to the credit standing of one or more underlying reference assets (see Figure 1).
In the case of a credit event, the coupon payment will be suspended and the investors
will receive a recovery rate in the form of either a cash settlement or physical delivery
of the underlying assets. Since the payments are funded with the help of securitization
techniques, the protection buyer (ie, the issuer of the notes) does not take the credit
risk of the seller (ie, the investor) if a credit event arises. This enables the participation
of a larger group of players, including retail investors who are willing to bear that
risk in return for a higher yield. Consequently, investors also bear the credit risk of
the corresponding CLN issuer.
Depending on the form of the embedded credit derivatives, CLNs can be further
divided into several categories, each of which has a more specific name (see Telpner
(2004, p. 10)). The scope of our work covers credit default notes and basket credit
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default notes, which represent the vast majority of the CLN variants in the German
retail market. We continue to use the generic term CLN since it is more widely known.
2.2 Hypotheses
The fact that the protection buyer of other credit derivative products must bear the
risk of a possible default on the part of the protection seller makes it very difficult to
offer most types of credit derivatives publicly in the retail market. Therefore, CLNs
are the only major credit derivative products available to retail investors and they
have been marketed worldwide as low-risk structured products. In Hong Kong and
Singapore, for example, CLNs have been labeled with the product name “mini-bond”
(for details on the CLN market for investors, see Fabozzi et al (2007, p. 77)). However,
for individual investors, the CLN construct is not easy to replicate because there
exists no adequate position in the retail market. Even if martingale probabilities for
single entities were available, basket products would be difficult to price. A potential
information asymmetry in the credit market could motivate CLN issuers to overprice
their products at their issuance. Therefore, our major hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 1: CLNs in the German retail market are generally overpriced.
In addition to the major hypothesis of overpricing, we also formulate several other
hypotheses regarding possible factors that could influence the significance of over-
pricing. Since the CLN contracts analyzed are all based on the principle of first-to-
default, we believe that the increased risk of CLNs with large numbers of underlying
reference entities cannot be fully compensated by their insignificantly higher coupon
rates when compared with single referenced products. Furthermore, calculating a fair
price for multiple referenced CLNs requires a level of expertise and computational
facilities that most retail investors do not have. In accordance with the idea of equity-
linked notes (see, for example, Hernández et al (2007b)) this lack of transparency
might encourage CLN issuers to overprice their products with multiple underlying
references even more than those with fewer entities or a single reference.
Hypothesis 2: the more underlying reference entities there are, the more significant
the overpricing will be.
The third hypothesis concerns the “first-sight effect” of coupon payments, which are
comparable to equity-linked bonds (Wallmeier and Diethelm (2009, p. 12)). There are
usually hidden factors behind high coupon rates, such as an extremely risky underlying
or a generally high interest level in the market that the investor does not realize. This
could be especially confusing for CLNs with mixed coupon structures, which usually
include fixed high-rate payments at the beginning followed by float-rate payments.
Therefore, the size and type of coupon payments could also affect the significance of
overpricing.
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Hypothesis 3: the higher the coupon rate, the more significant the overpricing.
Credit-linked notes with longer maturities incorporate a greater risk, which will
change the creditworthiness of the underlying reference entities. Since a longer matu-
rity usually indicates more payment days, the number of payment days will be used
as an additional control variable during the test. Moreover, we have discovered during
the valuation process that the complexity of the calculation strictly increases with the
number of payment days. According to our model, it could take days to determine
a fair price for a complex CLN product with a long maturity that also includes a lot
of payment days, especially if it has a large number of underlying references (see
Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005, p. 2980)). Employing the complexity argument again,
we can formulate the fourth hypothesis in a similar way to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: the longer the maturity, the more significant the overpricing will be.
We also want to discover whether overpricing has decreased in accordance with the
development of the CLN market (see Szymanowska et al (2009, p. 913)).
Hypothesis 5: the earlier the date of issue, the more significant the overpricing.
According to Szymanowska et al (2009, p. 917), the market power and marketing
strategy of the issuer might also have a significant influence. We want to discover
whether this is true using our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: the more products an issuer offers, the more significant the overpricing
will be.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Choice of model
Although there is still no industrial standard valuation model that applies to all credit
derivatives, two basic theoretical approaches are usually applied to modeling the
credit risks (Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002, p. 26)). On the one hand we have the
structured model, which was developed by Merton (1974). In compliance with Hui
and Lo (2002), the value of a firm is modeled as a continuous diffusion process, and
a default occurs if the firm value falls below a lower bound, which can be interpreted
as the liability of the firm. The stock price is normally used to calibrate the valu-
ation model, since stocks can be seen as options on firm value. On the other hand
there is the reduced-form model (Jarrow and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Sin-
gleton (1999)), which is characterized by assumptions regarding the intensity rate,
the risk-free rate, the correlation and the recovery rate. The default is modeled as
a stochastic event depending on the intensity rate of the underlying process, under
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which macroeconomic factors and firm-specific data can be integrated. The value of
related credit derivatives can be modeled as expectations depending on the realization
of the stochastic process involved. The calibration of the process is based on the prices
of defaultable instruments, such as bonds, which are used to build a complete interest
and credit-spread structure from which the probability of default can be derived.
When choosing the applied credit risk model, we faced a trade-off between using a
sophisticated model with historical parameter estimation (and therefore huge param-
eter uncertainty) and using a simplified approach with much less input and market-
based parameter estimation. Considering the advantages of the existing credit risk
models and the data available, we decided to use the reduced-form-model approach.
Our approach can be understood as a multiborrower Jarrow and Turnbull model for
which the default probabilities are calculated on the basis of credit default swap (CDS)
spreads. These probabilities are then used to calculate the net present value of a CLN
contract. In addition, we incorporate the asset correlation of the underlying assets so
that the model is flexible enough to model multiple defaults of the reference entities.
This is important for the valuation of CLNs with multiple references. The details of
our approach are explained in the following sections.
3.2 Valuation of CLNs with a single reference entity
3.2.1 CDS spreads and implied probability of default
Since a CLN can be interpreted as a bond with embedded CDSs, it is necessary to
derive the default probabilities from the CDS spreads of reference entities. These
implied default probabilities include the risk premium and, therefore, do not repre-
sent real probabilities.According to Merrick (2001), they are risk-neutral probabilities
in the option pricing methodology. According to the standard North American cor-
porate CDS contract specification of the International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation (2003), the annual CDS premium is paid quarterly, on March 20, June 20,
September 20 and December 20 of each year. Let the date of issue be t0 for a
CDS contract with maturity of n years. Then the dates of premium payments are
Tn D ft0:25; t0:5; t0:75; t1; : : : ; tng. On each of these dates, one-quarter of the annual
CDS spread (0:25CDSn) will be paid. On the other hand, according to the standard
North American corporate CDS converter specification of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (2009), the recovery rate of a senior CDS is 40%, which
implies RECCDS D 0:4.
As the data set is limited to annual CDS contracts, we have to impose assumptions
to calculate implied default probabilities for all possible maturities. To simplify the
case in hand, we assume that the recovery rate will also be paid on the next possible
CDS premium payment date in case of a default. This means that any credit event
occurring during a quarter of a year has to be settled accordingly at the end of the
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FIGURE 2 Cashflow of a one-year CDS.
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FIGURE 3 Cashflow of an n-year CDS in the nth year.
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respective quarter. Furthermore, the probability of default q is assumed for each CDS
contract to be the same in each quarter of the year. This assumption guarantees that
we are able to calculate four probabilities while having only one CDS spread. As an
alternative, we use a continuous-time default model and estimate the annual default
intensity, which leads to no elementary change in results.
On the basis of these two assumptions, we can now discount the expected cashflows
CF1;1 (see Figure 2), which should sum to zero so that no arbitrage is possible. We
start with the one-year CDS from the risk buyer’s point of view. The CDS spread is
set1 in such a way that the swap is priced fairly (see Hull and White (2003)):
CF1;1.1C r0:25/
0:25 C CF1;1.1  q1=4/.1C r0:5/
0:5
C CF1;1.1  q1=4/
2.1C r0:75/
0:75 C CF1;1.1  q1=4/
3.1C r1/
1 D 0
where CF1;1 D 0:6q1=4 C 0:25CDS1.1  q1=4/
(3.1)
1 It can be proven that is always a unique solution to this system of equations.
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With the spot rate rt yield curve and CDS spreads CDS1 prepared previously, the
quarterly probability of default for a one-year CDS q1=4 can be solved using this
equation. As a result we obtain the cumulative probability of default for the end of
the first year:
q1 D 1  .1  q1=4/
4 and q1=4 D 1 
4
p
1  q1 (3.2)
Since CDS contracts with different maturities share the same underlying reference
entity, they should also share the same cumulated probability of default during the
same period of time. Therefore, the cumulated default probability qn1 for the first
year can be adopted while calculating the quarterly probability of default qn1=4 for
a CDS with maturity of n years (see Figure 3 on the preceding page). Following
this procedure, we can calculate the quarterly probability of default for a CDS with














.1  qdk=4e=4/.1C rt=4/
t=4 D 0 (3.3)
where CFn;t D 0:6qdt=4e=4 C 0:25CDSn.1  qdt=4e=4/ is the cashflow of the CDS
with a maturity of n years at the payment date t and de represents the ceiling function
by Gauss. Since the first sum in Equation (3.3) has already been calculated by the
previous n1 applications of formula (3.3), the implied default probabilities qn=4 can
be solved by means of this above-mentioned equation. The cumulative probability of
default is defined recursively as:
qn D .1  .1  qn=4/
4/.1  qn1/ (3.4)
In our case we get a cumulative probability of default q1; q2; : : : ; qn for the end of
each year. Furthermore, it can be said that q0 D 0, since default at the date of issue
t0 is considered to be impossible. The last step is to estimate a continuous curve
of cumulated default probabilities by means of eleven data points, which consist of
ten implied probabilities at ten different times of maturity, and the origin, which we
have already calculated. The smoothing method that we apply is natural cubic spline
interpolation (Press et al (2007, pp. 120–124)). This results in a continuous isotonic
function of the cumulative probability of default defined asQ.t/ D s.q1; q2; : : : qn/,
as depicted in Figure 4 on the facing page.
3.2.2 Valuation of a CLN with a fixed coupon rate
Our first goal is to price a CLN with an annual or semiannual fixed coupon rate Cf
maturing at Tn at a face value of N . The issue price is Vi . Let the date of issue be T0
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FIGURE 4 Spline of implied default probabilities from CDS spreads.














































Time to maturity (years)
Implied default probability
CDS spreads
Daimler CDS spreads on October 24, 2007 and estimated cubic spline with nine equidistant inner break points and
forty polynomial coefficients.
FIGURE 5 Cashflow of a CLN with fixed coupon payments.
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and the following payment dates be T1; T2; : : : ; Tn. On the basis of the default proba-
bilities curveQ.t/we can estimate the cumulated probability of defaultQ.T1  T0/,
Q.T2  T0/, : : :,Q.Tn  T0/ accordingly on each of these days. The expected cash-
flows for a CLN with a fixed annual coupon rate Cf can be replicated, as shown in
Figure 5.
One major reason why CLN pricing could be difficult is that this kind of product
hardly ever defaults because the reference entities are usually giant corporations or
sovereigns with excellent creditworthiness. Therefore, it is hard to predict the recovery
rate in such a scenario. Due to the global financial crisis, we were able to observe the
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empirical recovery rate for the first time. After Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy
on September 15, 2008, the six affected CLNs of DZ Bank quoted at around 10%
of their face value. The only Lehman-referenced CLN of the Commerzbank even
quoted at 2%.2 Four weeks later, retail investors found the realized recovery rate
for one of these CLNs to be 8.8%. Furthermore, the product specification of the
Commerzbank defined a cash settlement of 1% of the nominal value as an alternative
to the delivery of the cheapest bond in case of a default. Taking all of this information
into account, we first assume the recovery rate of the CLNs to be 8.8%, which implies
RECCLN D 0:088. As a second assumption, we choose the recovery rate provided
by both rating agencies and the literature to be RECCLN D 0:35. In this case the rate
is a conservatively high value because the payment is not directly comparable with
the recovery rate, since the first one is fixed directly after the credit event. Therefore,
according to the prospectuses, the recovery rate is derived either from bonds quoted
or from the average quote of three other banks for a hypothetical claim, which is
downward-biased.
If we impose the further assumption that the issuer is nearly risk-free, we can simply
discount the expected cashflows back to the date of issue to determine the sum of the




..CfN.Tt  Tt1/C 1
N/.1 Q.Tt  T0//
C RECCLN N.Q.Tt  T0/ Q.Tt1  T0///.1C rTtT0/
T0Tt (3.5)
where  D bt=nc is the result of the floor function.
To calculate the overpricing we evaluate the difference between the theoretically fair
price Vf and the real issue price.V D Vi  Vf . A positiveV indicates overpricing
and vice versa.
Furthermore, we can assume the issue price to be fair and estimate the implied




tD1.CfN.Tt  Tt1/C 1
N/
.1 Q.Tt  T0//.1C rTtT0/
T0TtPn
tD1N.Q.Tt  T0/ Q.Tt1  T0//.1C rTtT0/
T0Tt
(3.6)
The price differenceV and the implied recovery rate RECimp are two major indica-
tors that determine whether a CLN product is overpriced.
3.2.3 CLNs with a floating coupon rate
As mentioned in Section 2, CLNs also include products with float-rate coupon pay-
ments. Since they only represent a minority of the whole data set, we have not explicitly
2 Price quoted on September 19, 2008 from Onvista.
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applied a complex interest rate model for them. Instead, in an analogous way to that
used for the practical approaches, we use the forward rates, which are derived from
spot rates on the date of issue and are applied to predict the coupon payments. Take
a CLN with a quarterly coupon payment of the three-month Euribor rate plus b basis
points as an example. In this example, the forward rate for the payment inTt is denoted
by rTt1;Tt . Adding the b basis points of bonus, the coupon rate for the period Tt1
to Tt is determined as:
CTt D .1C rTt1;Tt /
1=.TtTt1/  1C b.Tt  Tt1/ (3.7)
The calculation of the fair price and the implied recovery rate is similar to the case of
a CLN with a fixed coupon rate.
3.2.4 Valuation of a multiple-referenced CLN
So far, we have been able to value all of the observed CLNs using a single reference
entity. The next step is to extend our model to handle multiple referenced CLNs
with m reference entities. All of the observed CLNs follow the principle of “first-to-
default”, which means that as soon as one credit event of any underlying reference
entity is identified, the contract will be terminated and paid off immediately. The key
issue when pricing a CLN with more than one reference entity is to calculate the
probability under which a single reference entity or a group of reference entities will
default. Therefore, we extend our model to handle joint defaults.
We choose the single-factor model because it simply assumes that the economic
fortune of a creditor depends only on the realization of one latently underlying process,
which is interpreted by Merton as the asset value process.3 In this model, the default
probability qi of the creditor i is the probability under which the latent score variable
Ri falls below the threshold value ci (Hull (2009, pp. 512–516, 542–547)).
Qi .Tk/ D ProbTk .1Di D 1/ D ProbTk .Ri < ci / (3.8)
The score variableRi of a portfolio withm creditors can be parameterized by using
a single systematic factor, which represents the general uncertainty of the market. The
first step is to calculate the joint default probability of two or more different reference
entities regarding a time horizon of Tk , which can be expressed as:
Q1;2;:::m.Tk/ D ProbTk .1D1 D 1; 1D2 D 1; : : : ; 1Dm D 1/ (3.9)
This means that a joint default will occur if and only if credit events occur for all
creditors in the observed period of time. The joint default probability depends on the
3 Original work on the application of single-factor model for credit risk measurement includes Gordy
(2003) and Schönbucher (2007).
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joint distribution ofRi . Since the vectorR D .R1; R2; : : : ; Rm/ ism-dimensional and
normally distributed in the correlation matrix corr.R/, all of the marginal distributions
are also standard normally distributed. Therefore, the joint default probability can be
calculated as follows:
Q1;2;:::m.Tk/ D ProbTk .R1 < c1; R2 < c2; : : : ; Rm < cm/ D ˚m.c; corr.R//
(3.10)
where c D .c1; c2; : : : ; cm/0 is the vector of thresholds and ˚m is the distribution
function of an m-dimensional normal distribution with correlation corr.R/. Since ci
depends on the individual default probabilities pi , the joint default probability can




1; : : : ; ˚1.Qm.Tk//
1/T; corr.R// (3.11)
On the basis of the theory of a single-factor Merton model we can calculate the
joint default probability of any combination of reference entities within a portfolio
given the same time horizon:
Q2.1/;2.2/.Tk/;Q3.1/;3.2/;3.3/.Tk/; : : : ;
Qm1.1/;m1.2/;:::;m1.m1/.Tk/;Q1;2;:::m.Tk/ (3.12)
where j 2 Rj indicates all possible permutations of the original vector .1; 2; : : : ; j /.













j Š.m  j /Š
(3.13)
As the products are first-to-default notes, we are interested in the probability that


















For a CLN withm underlying reference entities we first need them cumulated default
probability curves of each individual entity, which can be derived from their CDS
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spreads. The cumulated default probability Qany.Tk/ can be evaluated for each pay-
ment day T1; T2; : : : ; Tn in the next step. These probabilities can now be used to
calculate the fair value in the same way as for the CLN with a single reference entity.
So far, we have developed a complete model that is able to value all of the observed
CLN products, provided that the data, including CDS spreads and asset correlations,
is available.
4 DATA SOURCES AND TOOLS
4.1 CLN data
As mentioned previously, we identified four major German CLN issuers.4 According
to our model, the common data that we need to obtain from each individual product
description is as follows:
(1) date of issue;
(2) payment dates, including the final payment day;
(3) coupon rate and payment structure;
(4) underlying reference entities.
Apart from the different product names given by the specific issuer, all of these CLN
products are constructed similarly. They only differ from each other in the following
respects:
(1) number of reference entities (single or multiple);
(2) type of reference entities (corporate or national sovereign);
(3) coupon type (fixed rate, float rate or a mixture of the two);
(4) payment structure (periodic or only at maturity);
(5) issue price and final payment (at, under, or over par).
Altogether, we observe 136 CLN products issued from December 2004 to September
2009. The descriptive statistics are depicted in Table 1 on the next page.










TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics of observed CLNs.
(a) Issuer, date of issue, maturity and number of references
Frequency Date of Frequency Frequency No. of Frequency
Issuer (%) issue (%) Maturity (%) references (%)
Commerzbank 26 2005 9 <1 year 3 1 37
DZ Bank 23 2006 13 1–3 years 24 2–5 54
HVB 13 2007 8 >3 years 73 6–10 5
LBBW 38 2008 41 >10 4
2009 29
(b) Coupon type, type of reference, number of payment days and price
No. of
Coupon Frequency Type of Frequency payment Frequency Frequency
type (%) reference (%) days (%) Price (%)
Floating 8 Sovereign 17 1 26 Under par 4
Mixed 10 Corporate 83 2–10 59 Par 75
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4.2 Other input parameters
Besides the CLN data obtained from the individual product descriptions, we also need
some other parameters to calculate values in accordance with our model. To discount
the cashflows to the date of issue, we need the risk-free spot rate on a daily basis. This
yield curve can be estimated by using the Svensson method (Svensson (1994)), which
is also used by the German Central Bank.According to the Svensson method, six input
parameters are required to calculate the spot rate. For Germany, these parameters are
available in the form of time series at the German Central Bank on a daily basis.
The CDS spreads of the reference entities were retrieved through the Thomson
Reuters Datastream, which uses the historical data of Credit Market Analysis as a
source.5 Daily quoted closing rates of senior CDSs with maturities from one to ten
years have been available for most of our required reference entities since 2005.
To calculate the joint default probabilities for CLNs with multiple underlying ref-
erence entities, we need their asset correlation. Therefore, for each underlying corpo-
ration, we used the stock return of 180 days preceding the date of issue. For national
sovereigns, we took the major stock index of each underlying country and calculated
the stock return of 180 days (see Table 2 on the next page). In general, Merton’s model
was applied to sovereigns as required (see Leerbass (1999)). According to that appli-
cation, the credit risk of a sovereign is closely related to the economic development
of a country, which is represented by its stock index. Therefore, the correlation of
stock indices may be a good proxy for the correlation of governments’ revenues in
Merton’s model for sovereigns. We note that each of these connections is not deter-
ministic. Nevertheless, we use this methodology only for correlations and not for the
implied default probabilities (Scholtens and Hameeteman (2003)).
5 TESTS AND RESULTS
5.1 Overpricing
The major objective of our work is to find out whether the outstanding CLN products
in the German retail market are overpriced. According to our model, this hypothesis
can be verified on the basis of either the difference between the calculated fair price
Vf and the issue price Vi, or the implied recovery rate. To enhance comparability,
we choose the price difference V as a percentage of the issue price. Assuming the
recovery rate to be 8.8%, we obtain the results depicted in Figure 6 on page 89.
As shown in the figure, only 1 out of the 136 CLNs analyzed was issued at the
theoretically fair price. All of the others were overpriced, with a maximal difference
of 45%. On average, the overpricing reached 8.87%, with a standard deviation of
5 See www.cmavision.com.
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TABLE 2 Overview of selected indices as proxies to estimate the default correlation of
national sovereigns.
Country Index
Austria Austrian Traded Index (ATX)
Belgium Brussels All Share
Brazil Brazil BOVESPA
Bulgaria BSE SOFIX
China Shanghai SE A Share
Croatia Croatian Equity MKT (CROEMI)
Colombia Colombia IGBC Index
Denmark OMX Copenhagen (OMX20)
Greece ATHEX All Share
Hungary Budapest (BUX)
India India BSE (100) National
Indonesia Jakarta SE LQ45
Italy Milan COMIT General
Mexico Mexico IPC (BOLSA)
Poland Warsaw General Index
Portugal Portugal PSI-20
Romania Romania BET (L)
Russia Russia RTS Index
South Africa FTSE/JSE All Share
Spain Madrid SE General
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS 30)
Switzerland Swiss Market (SMI)
Thailand Bangkok SET 50
Turkey ISE National 100
Ukraine Ukraine KP-DRAGON
UK FTSE All Share
Venezuela Venezuela DS Market
0.082. Following the methodology of Burth et al (2001), a Wilcoxon-signed rank
test was applied to verify that result. The probability of symmetrical distribution
is less than 0.5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis of symmetrically distributed price
differences is refuted. In other words, there exists a significant overpricing. Even if we
use a 35% recovery rate, the result does not change. The average overpricing is still
5.12%. According to the Wilcoxon-signed rank test, the hypothesis of symmetrical
distribution can be refuted if the significance level is smaller than 0.5%. Among the
sixty-eight most mispriced CLNs, there is only one that is underpriced. Taking that
into consideration, the result appears to be even more dramatic if we look at the option
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FIGURE 7 Implied recovery rate based on different correlations.
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component. In this case, the average overpricing is 67% and 53% for the two recovery
rates. However, the credit risk of the issuer is neglected in this calculation because it
would increase the overpricing.
On the other hand, to make the issue price fair, the implied recovery rates RECimp
have to be estimated accordingly. The average value of the implied recovery rate is
66%. Seventeen of the 136 CLNs are overpriced even if a recovery rate of 100% is
assumed (see Figure 7). The unrealistic recovery rates further prove that the analyzed
CLNs are significantly overpriced. As shown in Figure 8 on the next page, we divide
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FIGURE 8 (a) Average price difference and (b) implied recovery rate grouped by date of
issue.


























our data by date of issue to find out whether overpricing only exists for a certain
period of time. A comparison of the average price differences and the average implied
recovery rates of each year indicates that overpricing exists for the entire period of
time that we observed, ie, from the beginning of 2005 to the middle of 2009, reaching
a peak in 2007.
Finally, we simulate the two extreme cases of totally independent and totally depen-
dent defaults for CLNs with multiple underlying reference entities to test whether the
results are robust. In the first case, naturally, all CLNs are overpriced. In the latter
case we use the maximum of probabilities of all m entities as the first-to-default
probability.
Since, in the case of total dependency, these newly calculated and combined default
probabilities are generally lower than the ones calculated on the basis of the Merton
model, we will get less significant results of overpricing, which is indicated by smaller
positive price differences and lower implied recovery rates.
Compared with the above-mentioned results we have a smaller average price differ-
ence of 3.93%, with 121 out of the 136 CLNs being overpriced. The average implied
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recovery rate is lowered to 47.87% and, assuming a recovery rate of 100%, the same
seventeen products are still overpriced. Again, according to the Wilcoxon-signed rank




To test the other hypotheses regarding possible driving factors that could influence
the significance of overpricing, a multiple linear regression analysis is performed.
This analysis includes the following influence factors as independent variables (see,
for example, Hernández et al (2007b, p. 14)).
Number of reference entities (NoR): used to test hypothesis 2.
Coupon rate (CR): the agreed amount in percentage terms for CLNs with a fixed
coupon and estimated average value for CLNs with variable or mixed coupon,
used to test hypothesis 3.
Coupon type (CT): takes either the value 1 for purely fixed coupons or 0 for float-rate
based coupons. Used as an additional control variable to test hypothesis 3.
Maturity (Mat): duration of contracts expressed in years, used to test hypothesis 4.
Number of payments (NoP): number of agreed payment days assuming no defaults,
used to test hypothesis 5.
Date of issue (DoI): defined as the time since January 1, 2004, used to test hypothe-
sis 5.
Issuer (LBBW, DZ, HVB): three dummy variables for three larger issuers are
defined as independent variables to test hypothesis 6.
Two strong correlations are found by means of these independent variables (see Table 3
on the next page). These correlations can also be explained intuitively as follows:
 the longer the maturity of a CLN contract, the more likely it is that more
periodical coupon payments will be agreed upon;
 float-rate CLNs have more payment days since the coupons are mostly paid
every three months, while fixed-rate CLNs are mostly paid annually.
Furthermore, since all the HVB products are single referenced, representing the major-
ity of the single-referenced CLNs at the same time, there exist strong correlations
between the number of references and the issuer. After regressing each independent
variable with all of the others, we found only eight combinations that meet the require-








angTABLE 3 Correlation matrix of independent variables.
NoR CR DoI Mat NoP CT LBBW DZ COBA
NoR 1 0.03881 0.47495 0.18404 0.17891 0.01228 0.07692 0.12356 0.32509
CR 0.03881 1 0.24037 0.15025 0.16042 0.41029 0.09749 0.22463 0.33798
DoI 0.47495 0.24037 1 0.41845 0.20782 0.07002 0.133486 0.21773 0.15468
Mat 0.18404 0.15025 0.41845 1 0.81194 0.31682 0.33951 0.06210 0.19322
NoP 0.17891 0.16042 0.20782 0.81194 1 0.72108 0.23509 0.16282 0.26902
CT 0.01228 0.41029 0.07002 0.31682 0.72108 1 0.034441 0.24697 0.16279
LBBW 0.07692 0.09749 0.13349 0.33951 0.23509 0.03444 1 0.41211 0.45486
DZ 0.12356 0.22463 0.21773 0.06210 0.16282 0.24697 0.41211 1 0.31977
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TABLE 4 Combinations with uncorrelated regressors.
1 NoR CR DoI CT LBBW DZ
2 NoR CR DoI CT LBBW COBA
3 NoR CR DoI CT DZ COBA
4 NoR CR DoI Mat CT DZ COBA
5 NoR CR Mat CT DZ COBA
6 NoR CR DoI NoP LBBW COBA
7 NoR CR DoI NoP DZ COBA
8 NoR CR DoI NoP DZ LBBW
5.2.2 Regression model: base case
Since the fourth regression equation is the only one that includes maturity, coupon
type and coupon rate, we focus on it:
V D c0 C c1NORC c2CRC c3DoIC c4Mat C c5CTC c6DZC c7COBAC "
where c0 to c7 represent the coefficients to be estimated and " is the residual. The
result can be summarized, as shown in Table 5 on the next page. Comparing the
critical value obtained by means of the F -test with the generated test statistics, we
can see that the first regression is significant in general, with an adjusted coefficient
of determination of 53%. Four independent variables have a significant impact on the
extent of overpricing with a confidence level of 99%, namely, the number of reference
entities, the coupon rate, the coupon type and the maturity. Variables with positive
coefficients have a positive impact on the extent of overpricing, and vice versa.
However, we found that there exists heteroskedasticity of residuals of several inde-
pendent variables, which makes the results of t -statistics invalid. In the case of the
equation above, NoR and CT are affected. To have homoskedastic residuals, we
applied a weighted least-squares estimation to the data of affected independent vari-
ables (Griffith et al (1993, p. 502)). By applying this transformation to each indepen-
dent variable with heteroskedastic residuals, we obtain valid t -statistics accordingly
(indicated by h./). As a result, NoR, CR, Mat and CT remain significant.
5.3 Robustness checks with different independent variables,
different recovery rates and with the recovery rate as a
dependent variable
To check the robustness of these results, the same procedure was applied to the seven
other regression equations. The results of those regressions, which are based on the
dependent variableV , are shown in part (a) of Table 6 on page 96. Using the price dif-
ference as the dependent variable leads to heteroskedastic residuals for almost half of
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TABLE 5 Regression statistics of the base case.
(a) Regression statistics
Multiple correlation coefficient 0.7494
Coefficient of determination 0.5615
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.5376
Standard error 0.0557
Test statistics (F ) 23.4196
Observations 136




NoR 0.0393 h.p < 0.001/
CR 2.0388 p < 0.001
Mat 0.0096 0.0144




the independent variables. In accordance with the weighted least-squares regression,
NoR, CT, and NoP were tested for significance in all corresponding regressions.6
Besides the base case, Mat reaches a significance of 95% in its robustness check,
while the date of issue and the identity of the issuers could not be proved to have a
significant impact on the price difference.
As a further robustness check we estimated the above-mentioned regression equa-
tions by means of an alternative recovery rate of 35%. The results are depicted in
part (b) of Table 6 on page 97. Again, NoR, CR, CT and NoP were tested for signifi-
cance in all corresponding regressions. This is not the case if we consider the variable
Mat. Consequently, NoP seems to be determined by CT rather than by Mat, which
can be proven by the fact that CT of variable notes is extraordinarily high due to the
quarterly coupon frequency of the variable notes. Therefore, CT might be the result
6 According to a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and a likelihood-ratio test, the hypothesis of nonnormal
residuals cannot be rejected in all but two regressions on a 5% level. After correcting for the
heteroskedasticity the effect of nonnormality vanishes. Due to the application of DoI in seven of
the eight regressions as independent variables, positive or negative autocorrelation in the residuals
cannot be verified.
The Journal of Credit Risk Volume 7/Number 4, Winter 2011/12
Market pricing of credit-linked notes 95
of the use of the common bank approach in valuing floaters. Hence, it is unlikely that
credit risk-free floaters that are are priced correctly.
In our last robustness check we repeated the above-mentioned regressions using the
recovery rate as the new dependent variable. In contrast with the earlier regressions,
only a few equations showed heteroskedasticity, and only a few required transforma-
tion. All residuals proved to be distributed normally. Furthermore, we obtain a lower
adjusted coefficient of determination compared with the first regression. The results
of all regressions based on the dependent variable RECimp are shown in Table 7 on
page 98. Compared with the results based on price differences, the new regressions
suggest that the regressors NoR, CT and Mat are significant. While the significance
of NoP and CR could only be verified partially, the impact of issuer and date of issue
still cannot be proved robustly.
5.4 Discussion of the results
Consolidating the base case as well as the robustness checks, we conclude that the
first three hypotheses are valid for the analyzed data, while the other three hypotheses
cannot be verified statistically.
It is difficult, especially for retail investors, to estimate the default risks of large
numbers of underlying reference entities, since the calculation requires sophisticated
models and a wide range of data. This asymmetry of information often encourages
issuers to overprice their products. That complexity, measured here by the number of
reference entities, plays a key role and is supported by our results and by the extent of
overpricing, which is in line with many studies (see, for example, Gruenbichler and
Wohlwend (2005, p. 372), Hernández et al (2007b, p. 26), Szymanowska et al (2009,
p. 907) and Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005, p. 2986)).
Moreover, a complex coupon structure and long maturity that involve both fixed
and floating coupon rates might seem to be more attractive for most investors (for
similar results, see Benet et al (2006, p. 124) and Hernández et al (2007a, p. 33)) since
they often assess the conditions at the time of first sight. Hidden factors regarding
highly fixed coupon rates usually make these products even more overpriced compared
with those with a simple coupon structure. This is slightly inconsistent with studies
by Burth et al (2001, p. 13) and Hernández et al (2007b, p. 26), whose samples
include non-coupon-bearing instruments, but our results are consistent with those of
Wallmeier and Diethelm (2009, p. 17).
On the other hand, no significant impact on the extent of overpricing can be proved
for the factor date of issue and no significant difference is found with respect to
the pricing behavior of different issuers (see Hernández et al (2007a, p. 32) and
Szymanowska et al (2009, p. 916) for contrasting results) either. In this regard our









TABLE 6 Consolidated results of regressions based on price difference. [Table continues on next page.]
(a) Recovery rate 8.8% and asset correlation
Sig. Adj.
in R2
reg. (%) NoR CR CT DoI Mat NoP LBBW DZ COBA
1 53.4 0.0404 1.6316 0.0750 0.0136 — — 0.0289 0.0359 —
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ h.0.4063/ — — h.0.0079/ (0.0094) —
2 51.6 0.0398 1.6766 0.0775 0.0266 — — 0.0069 — 0.0194
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ .p < 0.001/ (0.0713) — — (0.5528) — (0.1690)
3 51.9 0.0385 1.6808 0.0743 0.0392 — — — 0.0148 0.0179
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ .p < 0.001/ h.0.0305/ — — — (0.2646) (0.1836)
4 53.8 0.0393 2.0388 0.0673 0.0169 0.0096 — — 0.0192 0.0101
h.p < 0.001/ .p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ (0.2740) (0.0144) — — (0.1436) (0.4542)
5 53.7 0.0412 1.8728 0.054 — 0.0094 — — 0.0176 0.0111
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ .p < 0.001/ — h.0.0067/ — — (0.1781) (0.4095)
6 52.7 0.0374 2.2184 — 0.0145 — 0.0325 0.0027 — 0.0141
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ — (0.3231) — h.p < 0.001/ (0.8123) — (0.3143)
7 53.4 0.0379 2.2012 — 0.0181 — 0.0318 — 0.0177 0.0066
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ — (0.2233) — h.p < 0.001/ — (0.1724) (0.6170)
8 53.8 0.0377 2.1727 — 0.0183 — 0.0305 0.0140 0.0304 —





















(b) Recovery rate 35% and asset correlation
Sig. Adj.
in R2
reg. (%) NoR CR CT DoI Mat NoP LBBW DZ COBA
1 52.7 0.0295 0.8804 0.0622 0.0127 — — 0.0222 0.0228 —
h.p < 0.001/ h.0.0126/ .p < 0.001/ (0.2305) — — h.0.0052/ h.0.0113/ —
2 51.2 0.0299 0.9275 0.0666 0.0107 — — 0.0090 — 0.0098
h.p < 0.001/ h.0.0111/ .p < 0.001/ (0.3205) — — (0.2879) — (0.3434)
3 50.9 0.0287 0.9274 0.0649 0.0134 — — — 0.0071 0.0121
h.p < 0.001/ h.0.0113/ .p < 0.001/ (0.2183) — — — (0.4651) (0.2199)
4 51.3 0.0288 1.1521 0.0604 0.0075 0.0041 — — 0.0090 0.0088
h.p < 0.001/ (0.0016) h.p < 0.001/ (0.5142) (0.1548) — — (0.3569) (0.3848)
5 51.5 0.0300 1.0153 0.0561 — 0.0048 — — 0.0083 0.0092
h.p < 0.001/ h.0.0059/ .p < 0.001/ — (0.0770) — — (0.3928) (0.3928)
6 47.3 0.0274 1.5003 — 0.0026 — 0.0221 0.0020 — 0.0064
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ — (0.8211) — h.p < 0.001/ (0.8246) — (0.5538)
7 47.8 0.0278 1.4836 — 0.0052 — 0.0219 — 0.0111 0.0036
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ — (0.6486) — .p < 0.001/ — (0.2650) (0.7247)
8 48.5 0.0271 1.4429 — 0.0051 — 0.0207 0.0124 0.0195 —
h.p < 0.001/ h.p < 0.001/ — (0.6525) — h.p < 0.001/ (0.1741) (0.0707) —
Column 2 shows the adjusted R2 of the original regression. Columns 3–11 show the estimated coefficient, with p-values in parentheses. h indicates a new estimation after














TABLE 7 Consolidated results of regressions based on implied recovery rate.
Sig. Adj.
in R2
reg. (%) NoR CR CT DoI Mat NoP LBBW DZ COBA
1 26.7 6.2123 98.0257 27.3149 5.7671 — — 1.0189 7.4707 —
h.0.0060/ .0.5463/ .p < 0.001/ .0.2685/ — — .0.8044/ .0.1317/ —
2 26.4 6.6862 13.5495 29.0858 5.5953 — — 0.6171 — 6.5418
h.0.0045/ .0.9354/ .p < 0.001/ .0.2836/ — — .0.8808/ — (0.1920)
3 29.2 7.3843 16.4707 26.9906 7.7148 — — — 10.369 8.9301
h.0.0016/ .0.9200/ .p < 0.001/ .0.1361/ — — — (0.0264) h.0.0278/
4 36.1 7.8137 163.9895 39.6412 14.8841 5.074 — — 8.0229 5.8097
.p < 0.001/ .0.2145/ h.p < 0.001/ .0.0051/ .p < 0.001/ — — .0.0723/ .0.2057/
5 32.6 10.4409 243.6709 35.0485 — 3.7503 — — 6.5828 4.9160
.p < 0.001/ .0.1405/ .p < 0.001/ — (0.0035) — — .0.1476/ .0.2955/
6 8.8 6.5998 338.0663 — 5.1777 — 3.3812 0.7875 — 6.3668
h.0.0104/ h.0.0438/ — .0.3797/ — (0.1329) .0.8645/ — (0.2558)
7 14.0 7.4900 311.9254 — 8.1734 — 2.5090 — 14.2042 11.6042
h.0.0031/ .0.0683/ — (0.1600) — (0.0056) — (0.0056) .0.0268/
8 10.8 6.5042 187.9799 — 6.3208 — 1.7019 1.7843 11.5074 —
h.0.0085/ .0.2678/ — (0.2813) — (0.4620) .0.7068/ .0.0413/ —
Column 2 shows the adjusted R2 of the original regression. Columns 3–11 show the estimated coefficient, with p-values in parentheses. h indicates a new estimation after
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6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we analyzed the pricing of the 136 outstanding CLNs of the four major
issuers in the German market. For this purpose we applied a market-based valua-
tion model for CLNs based on the reduced model by Jarrow and Turnbull, which we
extended using the single-factor Merton model to estimate the joint default probabili-
ties by means of asset correlations. The model was calibrated using CDS spreads and
correlations of stock returns for the underlying reference entities.
We discovered that the observed CLNs are generally greatly overpriced in the pri-
mary market. The result is, therefore, robust to changes in recovery rates or correlation
coefficients. Furthermore, four of the six hypotheses that we had previously formu-
lated were supported by our tests. For CLNs in the German market, we analyzed the
issue price for the first time, and our major finding is widely consistent with previous
results in the literature. Since they are market makers, issuers of structured financial
products participate in almost every transaction and, therefore, they have the incentive
to overprice. Furthermore, the more complex the product and the less transparent the
market, the more overpricing there tends to be. This consideration is confirmed by the
results regarding our major hypothesis of overpricing, and the extent of overpricing
is positively correlated with the number of underlying reference entities, the coupon
rates and the time to maturity of the contract.
There are a lot of possibilities for extensions to this work. In addition to the valuation
of CLNs on the date of their issue, we could apply the same model to calculate the
daily fair prices and compare them with the daily quoted prices. By tracking the
daily development of price differences, the hypothesis of the product life cycle can
also be tested for CLNs. Moreover, the change of interest rates can also be modeled
more specifically to calculate fair prices for CLNs with float coupon payments more
accurately. Last, but not least, the valuation framework can be used for CLN products
issued in other regions to test whether the hypotheses verified for the German market
are universally valid.
REFERENCES
Benet, B., Giannetti, A., and Pissaris, S. (2006). Gains from structured product markets: the
case of reverse-exchangeable securities (RES). Journal of Banking and Finance 30(1),
111–132.
Bielecki, T., and Rutkowski, M. (2002). Credit Risk: Modeling, Valuation and Hedging.
Springer.
Brown, C., and Davis, K. (2004). Dividend protection at a price: lessons from endowment
warrants. Journal of Derivatives 12(4), 62–68.
Burth, S., Kraus, T., and Wohlwend, H. (2001). The pricing of structured products in the
Swiss market. Working Paper, Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance, University of St.
Gallen, St. Gallen.
Technical Report www.journalofcreditrisk.com
100 A. Rathgeber and Y. Wang
Chen, A., Kensinger, J., and Pu, H. (1990). An analysis of PERCS. Journal of Financial
Engineering 3(6), 85–108.
Chen, K. C., and Sears, S. (1990). Pricing the spin. Financial Management 19(2), 36–47.
Duffie, D., and Singleton, K. (1999). Econometric modeling of term structures of defaultable
bonds. Review of Financial Studies 12(4), 687–720.
Entrop, O., Scholz, H., and Wilkens, M. (2009). The price-setting behavior of banks: an
analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the German market. Journal of Banking
and Finance 33(5), 874–882.
Fabozzi, F., Davis, H., and Choudhry, M. (2007). Credit-linked notes: a product primer.
Journal of Structured Finance 12(4), 67–77.
Gordy, M. (2003). A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules. Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation 12(3), 199–232.
Griffith, W., Hill, C., and Judge, G. (1993). Learning and Practicing Econometrics. John
Wiley & Sons, New York.
Gruenbichler, A., and Wohlwend, H. (2005).The valuation of structured products: empirical
findings for the Swiss market. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 19(4), 361–
380.
Hernández, R., Lee, W., and Liu, P. (2007a). An economic analysis of reverse exchange-
able securities: an option-pricing approach. Working Paper, Sam M. Walton College of
Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
Hernández, R., Lee, W., and Liu, P. (2007b). An economic analysis of the Japanese reverse
exchangeable market. Working Paper, Sam M. Walton College of Business, University
of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
Hui, C.-H., and Lo, C.-F. (2002). Effect of asset value correlation on credit-linked note
values. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 5(5), 455–478.
Hull, J. (2009). Options, Futures and Other Derivatives, 7th edn. Pearson, Upper Saddle
River, NJ.
Hull, J., and White, A. (2003). The valuation of credit default swaptions. Journal of Deriva-
tives 10(3), 40–50.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2003). Standard North American corpo-
rate CDS contract specification. ISDA, New York.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2009). Standard North American corpo-
rate CDS converter specification. ISDA, New York.
Jarrow, R., and Turnbull, S. (1997). A Markov model for the term structure of credit risk
spreads. Review of Financial Studies 10, 481–523.
Leerbass, F. B. (1999). A simple approach to country risk. Working Paper, University of
Dresden.
Merrick Jr., J. (2001). Crisis dynamics of implied default recovery ratios. Journal of Banking
and Finance 25(10), 1921–1939.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates.
Journal of Finance 29(2), 449–470.
Press, W., Teukolsky, S., Vetterling, W., and Flannery, B. (2007). Numerical Recipes: The
Art of Scientific Computation, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press.
Scholtens, B., and Hameeteman, D. (2003). Joint default probabilties and country risk.
Working Paper, University Groningen.
The Journal of Credit Risk Volume 7/Number 4, Winter 2011/12
Market pricing of credit-linked notes 101
Schönbucher, P. (2007). Credit Derivatives Pricing Models. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Stoimenov, P., and Wilkens, S. (2005). Are structured products “fairly” priced? An analysis
of the German market for equity-linked instruments. Journal of Banking and Finance
29(12), 2971–2993.
Svensson, L. (1994). Estimating and interpreting forward interest rates: Sweden 1992–
1994. IMF Working Paper 94/114, New York.
Szymanowska, M., Horst, J. T., and Veld, C. (2009). Reverse convertible bonds analyzed.
Journal of Futures Markets 29(10), 895–919.
Telpner, J. (2004). A survey of structured notes. Journal of Structured and Project Finance
9(4), 6–19.
Wallmeier, M., and Diethelm, M. (2009). Market pricing of exotic structured products: the
case of multi-asset barrier reverse convertibles in Switzerland. Journal of Derivatives
17(2), 59–72.
Wilkens, S., Erner, C., and Roeder, K. (2003).The pricing of structured products in Germany.
Journal of Derivatives 11(4), 55–69.
Technical Report www.journalofcreditrisk.com

